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This general equilibrium model seeks to find an explicit relationship between 
inheritance (and hence, the long run wealth distribution) and the unemployment, 
generated due to search-friction in the labor market. The existence of 
unemployment in the equilibrium is guaranteed together with a perfect and an 
imperfect labor market.  The model displays that inheritance affects unemployment 
positively in micro-level. Amongst the different countries as a whole, a negative 
relationship between income and unemployment is established. The model ensures that a 
dynasty does not get stagnated in a particular income class. By simulating the 
model, we isolate the initial income distribution from the long run income path and 
question the efficacy of the celebrated trap theory. 
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1. Introduction  
Casual observation on real world shows two contraindicative facts: most of the 
unemployed persons do not represent the poorest mass of a country and on the contrary, all 
most all underdeveloped countries register a high rate of unemployment. This acts as the 
primary motivation behind the current work. At micro level, people with higher wealth 
become more selective to accept a job. Hence, the possibility of remaining unemployed 
increases with higher wealth. On the other hand, developed countries do have a more 
efficient labor market with a lesser unemployment problem. Therefore a clear discordance 
exist between micro and macro level actuality. Next few paragraphs display some empirical 
result to establish these two apparently conflicting observations.  
A simple empirical exercise is taken in this project using American Time Use Survey 
(ATUS) data. A significant (at 10% level) positive relation for 4 years within 2003-2009 
has been found between family income of the different individuals and the total time spent 
for job search, waiting and other activities, not associated with earning. Detail result of that 
exercise is given in the following table. 
Year Spearman's rho Prob > |t| 
2003 0.0169 0.0106 
2004 0.0059 0.4654 
2005 -0.0135 0.1053 
2006 0.0142 0.0846 
2007 0.0190 0.0251 
2008 0.0271 0.0016 
2009 -0.0012 0.8883 
 
Previous data (from 2000 to 2009) of Consumer Expenditure Survey provided by US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals that annual personal income (before tax) of the people 
who earn from (source of income) unemployment benefit is least in the lowest income 
quintiles. For each time period represented in the tables, consumer units are ranked in 
ascending order, according to the level of total before-tax income reported by the consumer 
unit. The ranking is then divided into five equal groups as five different quintiles. There is 
an increasing tendency of unemployment with income quintile at least till third quintile. 
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The following figure3 showcases yearly average consumption expenditure of the 
individuals earning from unemployment compensation. 
 
If total personal income from unemployment compensation is taken as a proxy of number 
of unemployed people in an income quintile, then it is evident that unemployment rises for 
higher income class for the first four quintiles.  
Hence the above analysis suggests the existence of a positive relationship between wealth 
and unemployment within an economy.  
  
This model accommodates both organized sector and unorganized sector with status 
conscious individual preference (exact form of the preference function is discussed in the 
next section). In every economy unemployment and unorganized sector persists 
simultaneously (along with the organized sector). This co-existence of unemployment and 
unorganized sector within an economy is theoretically somewhat enigmatic. After an active 
search for the job if an individual fails to get employed in the organized sector, then staying 
without earning (which is the definition of unemployment4) should be dominated by getting 
                                                            
3 Source: bureau of Labor Statistics, US. http://www.bls.gov/cex/#tables (Quintiles of income before taxes ) 
4The "unemployed" comprise all persons above a specified age who during the reference period were 
"without work", “currently available for work” and “seeking work”. 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/res/ecacpop.pdf 
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a job in the unorganized sector where obtaining a job (i.e. a strictly positive earning 
opportunity) is relatively easier. Our model, in line with the real world observation, 
establishes the existence of unemployment in equilibrium after incorporating the 
unorganized sector with a perfect labor market. Here the difference in the level of 
inheritance is very crucial to guarantee the existence of the two classes of people, namely 
unemployed and unorganized sector worker. Intuitively the argument is the following: 
people with lesser inheritance level are less capable to afford to remain jobless. On the 
other hand wealthier individuals like to avoid working in the technologically inferior 
unorganized sector. Thus we connect the labor market with the wealth distribution, and 
explain the wealth dynamics of a dynasty with the help of the degree of labor market 
efficiency. Here lies the main contribution of this work. 
We assume that the technological superiority exists for the organized sector, but with the 
factor market imperfection. In this sector laborers cannot freely enter the market to supply 
their labor. Firms also do not get the worker freely to fill the vacant post. There exists a 
costly search and matching friction in the organized sector labor market. That allows the 
scope of extracting some positive rent out of this market interaction. Both firm and workers 
of this sector have a bargaining power on wage negotiation. Specifically we utilize Nash 
bargaining to model the factor market payments. Alongside this imperfection in the factor 
market of the organized sector, the search and matching modeling mechanism is also 
incorporated in our set up. 
Search and matching models are developed eyeing on the fact that the labor market are not 
frictionless. Nexus between a job and a worker is established after a complex process of 
search; and more crucially, the search process may not yield a successful match at a 
particular point of time for a particular searcher (either firm or worker). Matching function 
plays a very pivotal role in this literature. ‘Inputs’ of this function are the stock of 
unemployment and vacancies, and the matching function declares the rate at which 
successful job-matches are formed from the total number of searchers (including both 
laborer and employer). In our analysis Pissarides type (Pissarides (2000)) setup is followed 
to design the matching function, empirical backings of which are strong (Pissarides (1986), 
(1990); Layard et al. (1991); Blanchard and Diamond (1989), (1990); Coles and Smith 
(1996)).   
5 
 
 
In our model economy one individual has a single unit of labor which she can deliver 
inelastically to the firm. Her single unit of labor can earn a higher wage by supplying it to 
the organized sector, although receiving a job in that sector depends on a successful match. 
On the other hand, the disutility obtained by an agent while working in the unorganized 
sector confronts her with a choice problem at the time of entering into the job market. 
Individuals optimally decide for both the periods at the beginning of their life regarding 
the usage of the labor endowment, but consume and save for their following generation at 
the end. We present our model more formally and examine the optimal decision taken by 
the agents in the next section.  
There are quite large literatures dealing with search generated unemployment following 
Pissarides type matching. Although incorporating the concept of unorganized sector in this 
modeling set up is not really ample. Davidson and Matusz in (2006) established 
equilibrium unemployment in that set up along with the concept of unorganized sector. 
Skill heterogeneity was the decisive characteristic in their modeling strategy. Existing 
literature does not include inheritance with unemployment in a general equilibrium frame. 
A relation between inheritance (termed there as wealth) and choice of occupation was 
formulated in Banerjee & Newman, (1993). In their model of occupational choice, a 
window was kept open for the least wealthy individuals to remain idle; but lacks to explain 
why the wealthier individuals are more probable to remain unemployed. Moreover in their 
contribution ‘remain idle’ cannot be a feasible option in the equilibrium either. 
Bequest motive (which has enough empirical support as well; e.g. Wilhelm, 1996; Altonji 
et al., 1997; Carroll, 2000) of the agent generates an inheritance distribution in the 
discussed setup. Agents are willing to save a part of their wealth for the intergenerational 
transfer and, the inheritance of the offspring is a function of that transferred part. Hence 
this recursive process leads us in the direction of income dynamics. Starting from any initial 
income, the labor market search friction in our model randomizes the next point of the 
income path. That evident feature not only rescues a dynasty from getting stagnated into a 
particular income class but also stops the long run income path from being concentrated 
(or polarized) in some particular point or points (c.f. Galor and Zeira (1993)) or mutually 
exclusive small intervals (c.f. Grossman (2008)) on the income stream. At this point our 
model supports Banerjee and Newman (1993). We elucidate this topic further and put 
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forward some discussion about the transition probabilities for the different dynasties in 
section 3.  
Invariably discussions on income dynamics questions about the convergence issue. Galor, 
(1996) pointed out that, debates related to the convergence of income distribution focuses 
on the validity of the three competing hypothesis: absolute convergence, conditional 
convergence and club convergence. Definition of the absolute convergence is the 
following: per capita incomes of countries converge to one another in the long-run 
independently of their initial conditions. Whereas conditional convergence means that per 
capita incomes of the countries that are identical in their structural characteristics converge 
to one another in the long-run independently of their initial conditions. Club convergence 
claims per capita incomes of the countries with identical structural characteristics to 
converge to one another in the long-run provided that their initial conditions are similar as 
well.  
According to the above classification our hypothetical economy can converge 
conditionally. By simulating our model, we isolate the initial income distribution from the 
long run income path (as in Loury,(1981)) and this questions the efficacy of the celebrated 
big push theory. It is here where we differ from Grossman,(2008); Zhang(2008), Galor and 
Zeira,(1993); Banerjee and Newman (1993) etc. Section 4 studies the long run dynamics 
of the income of the individuals and the labor market where we ensure the long run 
matching probabilities as non-unity and non-zero. 
In section 5 we demonstrate how our model fits with the previously mentioned empirical 
findings. In our model, disparity between a high and a low average income country is 
observed through the heterogeneity of the efficiency of the respective labor markets. Hence 
the obtained policy recommendation is to moderate the labor market parameters. Primarily 
this reduces the labor market imperfection; and the economy as a whole starts to move 
from poor to rich. Thus in section 5, we discuss the comparative statics results and try to 
find possible avenue of the policy intervention.  
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2. A Brief Empirical Analysis 
In this section some results are explored by analyzing data. A positive impact on the 
proportion of the unemployed mass vis-à-vis the number of the unorganized sector workers 
is found through the individuals’ wealth level within a country. It is also demonstrated that 
there is a negative relation between GDP and unemployment among different countries. In 
the next sub-section within a country analysis is done. Section 2.2 deals with inter country 
study.  
 
2.1. Within a country analysis 
The study is done for the India. We concentrate on the National Sample Survey (NSS) data.  
 
2.1.1. Case study of India: Data description 
For the present purpose 59th round of the NSS data is used. NSSO in this round of survey 
has reported the individual level data of occupational status and the detail of the wealth of 
each households. Wealth includes household specific information on the value of land, 
house, livestock holding, durable goods, investment etc. No other rounds after 59th round 
has covered all these information in detail. Span of survey for the 59th round was 1st 
January 2003 to 31st December 2003.  
  
2.1.2. Case study of India: Summary statistics 
For the present purpose all individuals (under survey) are categorized into three different 
classes: unorganized sector worker, organized sector worker and unemployed. According 
to the segregation done in this part of the analysis, unorganized sector workers comprise 
of: self-employed as own account worker, worked at household enterprises as employer, 
worked at household enterprises as helper, casual wage laborers at public work and at other 
types of work, beggars, prostitutes and laborers who are available for casual job but did not 
work due to sickness. Organized sector workers are those who are regular salaried/wage 
employees. People who are not working but seeking or available for work are listed as 
unemployed.  
The other major variable of interest is the value of long term durable assets. In this analysis 
the total asset of a household is defined as the sum total of value of lands and buildings, 
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value of the transport equipment, value of other durable assets (like ornaments, television, 
refrigerator, furniture etc.), value of shares, bonds and value of other non-share financial 
assets. At the beginning of the analysis, we drop those sample households under survey 
who are un-capable and reluctant to provide information. Per unit asset of an individual is 
generated from the total value of the household’s wealth by dividing it with the total 
number of the members of that particular household excluding servants (here onwards we 
call it as household size). Therefore, 
Per unit asset = 
value of the total asset of a household
household size
.  
The analysis is restricted for the individuals of age 18 to 35. Occupational choices are made 
mostly within this age group. Following table highlights on the descriptive stats of the per 
unit asset for overall India, rural India and urban India.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of per unit asset 
Per unit asset Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Overall India 504971 65045.49 168403.4 0 2.09e+07 
Rural 325309 54211.58 116991.2 0 9632400 
Urban 179662 84662.15 233088.3 0 2.09e+07 
  
Occupational choice depends not only on the per unit asset of the individuals, but on many 
other factors. So we need to set controls for the other variables which can possible affect 
the occupational pattern to comprehend the relation between asset and the occupational 
choice correctly. In this analysis age, sex, education, religion and social group are the 
control variables. Descriptive statistics for the control variables and some more details for 
per unit asset are given in the appendix.  
  
2.1.3. Case study of India: a simple OLS model. 
This sub-section explores the relation between occupational choice and per unit asset. More 
precisely, the focus of this paper is exploring the choice between remaining unemployed 
vis-à-vis to joining in the unorganized sector, and the claim is, this choice has a relation 
with asset class. 
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The whole range of per unit asset (taken in logarithm5) is divided into suitable number of 
intervals (or classes). According to that division of the asset class, the proportion of 
unemployed to unorganized sector worker is computed, and that becomes the dependent 
variable of this model. The aim is to check whether this proportion is increasing or 
decreasing with the median value for each asset class significantly after controlling the 
other factors. Correlation coefficients of these two variables for rural and urban Indian are 
0.29 and 0.25 respectively. 
Following equation describes the model: 
𝒚 = 𝜹𝟏 + 𝜹𝟐 ∗ 𝒙 +∑𝜹𝟑𝒊 ∗ 𝒍𝒏
𝟏𝟎
𝒊=𝟏
(𝑬𝒊) + 𝜹𝟒 ∗ 𝑴 +∑𝜹𝟓𝒊 ∗ 𝒍𝒏
𝟕
𝒊=𝟏
(𝑹𝒊) +∑𝜹𝟔𝒊 ∗ 𝒍𝒏
𝟑
𝒊=𝟏
(𝑮𝒊) + 𝝐 
Where, 𝑦 ≡ ln(
asset class wise freq of unemployed
asset class wise freq of informal worker
)  
𝑥 ≡ median of each asset classes in log scale  
𝐸𝑖 ≡ frequency of individuals at the education level 𝑖 per asset class   
𝑀 ≡ frequency of male individuals per asset class   
𝐺𝑖 ≡ frequency of individuals at the social group 𝑖 per asset class   
𝑅𝑖 ≡ frequency of individuals of religion 𝑖 per asset class  
𝜖 ≡ random error. 
We compile the results for rural and urban India separately. R-square value is 0.5145 for 
the rural India. Other regression results are tabulated below. 
Table 2: Regression result for rural India 
𝒚 coef. (𝛿−1) P-value st. Error 
𝒙 0.1063 *** 0.002 0.0338 
 
Education level per 
asset class: level 1 -0.0084 0.24 0.0072 
𝐸2  -0.0084*** 0.001 0.0025 
𝐸3  -0.0079* 0.078 0.0045 
𝐸4  -0.01159* 0.08 0.006 
𝐸5   0.0018 0.811 0.0076 
𝐸6  -0.0232*** 0.001 0.0052 
𝐸7  -0.00694 0.139 0.0047 
𝐸8   0.0058*** 0.008 0.0101 
𝐸9   omitted   
                                                            
5 Logarithmic scale is taken to control the outliers.  
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𝐸10   0.0049 0.165 0.0035 
 
Male individuals per 
asset class 
 
 
 0.2037 
 
 
0.6 
 
 
0.3887 
 
Individuals of religion 
1 per asset class 
 
 0.0161 
 
0.131 
 
0.0107 
𝑅2 -0.0028 0.608 0.0055 
𝑅3 -0.0161*** 0.001 0.0046 
𝑅4 -0.8054*** 0.001 0.0025 
𝑅5 -0.0028 0.415 0.0034 
𝑅6 -0.0079*** 0.001 0.0021 
𝑅7  omitted   
 
Individual of social 
group 1 per asset class -0.0027 0.7 0.0069 
𝐺2 -0.0108*** 0.018 0.0046 
𝐺3 -0.0131** 0.062 0.007 
Constant(𝜹𝟏) -4.6694*** 0.001 0.50067 
 
R-square value is 0.3061 is highly significant for the urban India also. Other regression 
results are tabulated below. 
Table 3: Regression result for urban India 
𝒚 Coef.. (𝛿−1) P-value st. Error 
𝒙  0.0494 ** 0.020 0.0211 
 
Education level per 
asset class: level 1 -0.0033 0.387 0.0039 
𝐸2  -0.0019 0.289 0.0018 
𝐸3  -0.0122*** 0.001 0.0025 
𝐸4  -0.0495 0.233 0.0041 
𝐸5  -0.0089* 0.086 0.0052 
𝐸6  -0.0079 0.188 0.006 
𝐸7  -0.1036*** 0.015 0.0042 
𝐸8   0.0022 0.308 0.0021 
𝐸9   omitted   
𝐸10  -0.0066* 0.054 0.0065 
 
Male individual per 
asset class  0.0629 0.777 0.2215 
 
Individuals of religion 
1 per asset class  0.1411 0.388 0.1634 
𝑅2 -0.0037 0.415 0.0047 
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𝑅3 -0.0012 0.654 0.0025 
𝑅4 -0.0009 0.613 0. 0018 
𝑅5 -0.0007 0.706 0.0019 
𝑅6 -0.0009 0.620 0.0019 
𝑅7  0.0019 0.695 0.0049 
Individual of social 
group 1 per asset class -0.0013 0.616 0.0026 
𝐺2 -0.0063* 0.060 0.0033 
𝐺3 -0.0004 0.959 0.0036 
Constant(𝜹𝟏) -2.4785*** 0.001 0.3451 
In this model 𝑦 depends significantly and positively on 𝑥 with a negative. Hence given this 
empirical result it can be argued that Indian economy wealth class has a statistically 
significant positive influence on opting unemployment over informal sector job. This is 
true for both rural and urban India.  
 
2.1.4. Case study of India: Robustness check. 
Until now this empirical study focuses on asset class. The conclusions made from the 
analysis is based, therefore, on certain level of aggregated data. As we know, aggregation 
always allows some possibility of bias in the results. So, for further verification of the 
above mentioned results this sub-section deals with individual level data.  
Here a multinomial probit model with instrumental variable is formalized. As a major 
independent variable we take per unit asset (of a particular individual) itself and not the 
asset class. The control variables, like age, sex, education level, social group and religion 
are also taken at the individual level. The dependent variable, occupational choice, is a 
categorical variable, which can take four values: working at the unorganized sector takes 
the value 1, working at the organized sector takes the value 2, if the individual remains 
unemployed then 3 is the assigned value, and 4 if otherwise. (This categorization is not 
ordered. The rank of the category is not important for the analysis). To deal with this kind 
of a model, a multinomial probit model is introduced. Here our interest is to find the change 
in the probability of switching from unorganized sector to unemployment as a function of 
per unit asset level. 
Although the individuals are selected belonging to the age-group 18 to 35, the following 
endogeneity problem may arise: the occupational choice can also affect the possession of 
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the long run asset of an individual. So to make the result more robust instrumental variables 
are introduced.  
The two identified instruments considered here are the number of young members (age 
below 35) in the household and the marginal propensity to save of the household (in which 
that particular individual belongs). If the number of young members increase, then it is 
expected that the per capita wealth the household will be less, but that increase does not 
affect the occupational choice of the individual directly. Most of the macro-economic 
models assume that if the propensity to save is on the higher end then the total savings of 
the household rises. That may lead to a higher level of per unit asset. Savings propensity 
of the house hold does not affect the occupational choice directly.  
Given this set up of multinomial probit with instrumental variables, the model has been 
computed for the rural and urban India separately. Per unit asset of an individual 
significantly and positively affects the probability of remaining unemployed in comparison 
to the probability of joining to the unorganized sector. This holds good for both rural and 
urban sector. The detailed result is tabulated in the appendix.  
 
2.2. Relation between GDP and overall unemployment.  
Now concentrating on overall country-wise data, following results are obtained. An 
empirical exercise, which is undertaken in this paper, for 100 countries (for the initial years 
data for few countries were not available) over 32 years (1980-2011) shows a steady 
negative relationship between unemployment and GDP6. It is a cross section analysis for 
each year. We fit a line for unemployment against GDP, where countries are considered as 
the different observations. GMM criterion is used to abate the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. Coefficients of GDP for all the years are significant at 10% level and it 
is true for 30 years at 5% level of significance. 
Table 4: Relation between GDP and unemployment. 
Year Coefficient value p-value Year Coefficient value p-value 
1980 -0.0005395*** 0.004 1996 -0.0001607*** 0.006 
1981 -0.0005036*** 0.002 1997 -0.0001758*** 0.002 
1982 -0.0004586*** 0.008 1998 -0.0002013*** 0.001 
1983 -0.0004193*** 0.007 1999 -0.0001987*** 0.001 
1984 -0.0003231*** 0.022 2000 -0.0002152*** 0.001 
                                                            
6 Source: IMF database, http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28. 
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1985 -0.0002917*** 0.026 2001 -0.0002194*** 0.001 
1986 -0.0002584*** 0.025 2002 -0.0002091*** 0.001 
1987 -0.0002405*** 0.026 2003 -0.00018*** 0.001 
1988 -0.0002268*** 0.022 2004 -0.0001649*** 0.001 
1989 -0.0001981*** 0.019 2005 -0.0001486*** 0.001 
1990 -0.0002259*** 0.003 2006 -0.0001361*** 0.001 
1991 -0.0001937*** 0.006 2007 -0.0001237*** 0.001 
1992 -0.0001852*** 0.013 2008 -0.0001114*** 0.001 
1993 -0.000131** 0.063 2009 -0.0000805*** 0.017 
1994 -0.0001064** 0.084 2010 -0.0000733*** 0.04 
1995 -0.0001287*** 0.023 2011 -0.0000745*** 0.033 
From the above discussion two apparently conflicting facts come into light. There is a clear 
negative relationship between income and unemployment amongst the different countries 
as a whole, as opposed to a positive association between the same two within an economy. 
From the above discussion two apparently conflicting facts come into light. There is a clear 
negative relationship between income and unemployment amongst the different countries 
as a whole, as opposed to a positive association between the same two within an economy. 
Present theoretical model aims to resolve this anomaly using a general equilibrium frame 
work with search generated unemployment. 
 
3. The Model 
We model an economy, producing a single good using labor as the only factor of 
production. The modelling mechanism allows for intertemporal dynamics through 
intergenerational transfer of wealth. 
 
3.1  Preferences and time 
Consider a discrete time framework where at the beginning of a period, a new batch of 
population who lives for two periods, joins the economy. Let the total mass of each 
generation be normalized to unity (thus in our economy there is no population growth).  
So, a new and an old (call them as ‘young’ and ‘old’ respectively) group of people live 
simultaneously at each time period and therefore at any instance, total population mass is 
two. These individuals consume the single manufactured good, produced using labor which 
each individual is identically endowed with (for simplicity we have assumed away other 
factors of production, like capital and also set the discount rate as zero).  
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Let us name the young age of an agent as period 1 and period 2 as her old age. Each 
individual receives some wealth as inheritance (X) from her previous generation. 
Individuals cannot save and hence she completely exhausts her income earned plus her 
inheritance at any period (in her lifetime) to purchase the produced good at that period. All 
the activities associated with the realization of utility (consumption of the purchased goods 
and leaving a bequest) occur at the end of her lifespan. Thus an individual born at time 
period 𝑡, is assumed to have a preference structure given by: 
𝑈 =
1
𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼)1−𝛼
𝑐 1−𝛼𝑏𝛼 − 𝐷𝑡𝑘𝑋𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡+1𝑘𝑋𝑡  with 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) and 𝑘 > 0                     (5) 
The above function reveals that an individual gets positive utility (𝑈) from consumption 
(c) and bequest (b). The indicator 𝐷 takes the value either equal to 1 or 0, depending on the 
type of employment that the individual receives at the subscripted time. 𝐷 equals to 1 if 
the individual joins unorganized sector, otherwise it takes the value 0.  
  
3.2  Production 
Though only one good is produced in the economy, there are two sectors that engage in 
this productive activity. One sector, termed as the organized sector, utilizes a technology 
where one unit of labor produces 𝑝 units of the consumable, whereas the other sector: the 
unorganized sector, produces 𝑎 units of the good. Each firm of both the sector uses a single 
worker at a time. The technological superiority of the organized sector is assumed by taking 
𝑝 > 𝑎. This technological dominance of the organized sector is also reflected in the 
preference structure of the individual’s. The utility function of a representative individual 
thus, exhibits disutility from working in the unorganized sector. This disutility is a positive 
function of her inheritance level, which reflects her social status.  
The unorganized sector is characterized by perfect competition in both product and factor 
markets while the organized sector has the same only in its product market.  
 
3.3  Factor market 
At every point of time, each individual in our economy is endowed with an indivisible unit 
of labor which she can supply either to the organized or to the unorganized sector. Factor 
market of organized sector is not perfect and consists of search frictions. So at any point of 
time, a pool of job seekers searches for jobs in the organized sector and at the same time, 
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are there firms in this sector, looking for workers to commence production. This “trade in 
the labor market”7 is uncoordinated. So this may well be the case that some of the vacant 
posts fail to get a worker, on the other hand some worker remain jobless after an active 
search. Here we use a simple modeling device to capture this scenario. We assume a 
Pissarides type matching function that gives the number of jobs formed at any moment in 
time as a function of the number of workers looking for jobs and the number of firms 
looking for workers. The matching function is increasing in its each arguments, and is 
concave and homogenous of degree one. The particular functional form assumed is the 
following: 
𝑚𝑡 = [𝑢𝑡
𝜃 + 𝑣𝑡
𝜃]
1
𝜃 
Where, 𝑚𝑡 be the proportion of the population who are matched, 𝑢𝑡 be the proportion of 
searching population in the total population at time t and 𝑣𝑡 be the ratio of total number of 
vacancy and total population at time t.  This form of matching function was used in 
Stevens(2007). 
For simplicity let us assume 𝜃 = −1.   
Hence,  
𝑚𝑡
𝑢𝑡
=
𝑣𝑡
𝑢𝑡+𝑣𝑡
≡ 𝜌𝑡(𝑠𝑎𝑦) and 
𝑚𝑡
𝑣𝑡
=
𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡+𝑣𝑡
≡  𝜋𝑡 (𝑠𝑎𝑦).   
Therefore, 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 = 1.                                                                                                (1)                
i.e. the probability of getting a job (𝜌𝑡) and the probability of getting a worker for a vacant 
job (𝜋𝑡) adds up to 1.  
Let 𝜙𝑡 be the proportion of the young in the searching population. Then 𝜙𝑡𝜌𝑡 represents 
the proportion of young agents getting an organized sector job at time 𝑡. On the other hand 
(1 − 𝜙𝑡)𝜌𝑡 becomes the proportion of old individuals who secure their job in the organized 
sector at time 𝑡. Similarly, 𝜙𝑡𝜋𝑡 is the matching probability of a young worker with a vacant 
post, likewise a vacant post finds an old worker with the probability (1 − 𝜙𝑡)𝜋𝑡.   
Contrary to the existing search-matching literature where a job and an employee are 
separated by a random shock, job destruction in our case occurs automatically when an 
employed worker completes her lifespan. That is, once the organized sector job is formed, 
it cannot be destroyed by any exogenous force in the life span of the laborer. To an 
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organized sector firm (1 − 𝜋𝑡) is the probability of not having a successful match with a 
worker.  
A job seeker in the organized sector may remain jobless with probability (1 − 𝜌𝑡). So, 
(1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝜙𝑡 gives the proportion of young unemployed persons and (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜙𝑡) is 
the proportion of old in the unemployed mass.  
 An individual does not receive any wage if she remains unemployed. Alternatively, she 
may opt for a job in the unorganized sector, in which she instantaneously receives 
employment and earns a positive wage (note that factor market in the unorganized sector 
is frictionless).  Hence a source of labor force supply to the unorganized sector may come 
from the unmatched pool of organized sector.  
 
3.4   The organized sector firms 
To post a vacancy organized sector firm has to bear a strictly positive fixed cost. From our 
earlier discussion it is evident that there may arise three cases after a vacancy is posted in 
the organized sector. Other than the possibility of not getting a worker, two more events 
may occur. A vacant post can be matched either with a young worker or with an old worker. 
The difference between the last two situations is the following: young worker can work for 
two consecutive periods where as an old can supply her labor for only one period.  
We use 𝐽𝑦𝑡 to denote the expected infinite income stream from a filled job having a young 
worker at time ‘t’ and  𝐽𝑜𝑡 to denote the analogous value for an old worker. 𝑉𝑡, on the other 
hand is used to denote the expected infinite income stream from a vacancy. New firms 
enter the market as long as 𝑉𝑡 remains positive.   
Let 𝑤𝑠𝑦 be the wage of the young worker employed in the organized sector. 𝑤𝑠𝑜is the wage 
paid to an old worker in the same sector.   
Now we can write the following relations: 
𝐽𝑦𝑡 = 2(𝑝 − 𝑤𝑠𝑦) + 𝑉𝑡+2                                                                                                              
𝐽𝑜𝑡 = (𝑝 − 𝑤𝑠𝑜) + 𝑉𝑡+1                                                                                                                 
𝑉𝑡 = −𝑑 + 𝜋𝑡+1[𝜙𝑡+1𝐽𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝜙𝑡+1)𝐽𝑜𝑡+1] + (1 − 𝜋𝑡+1)𝑉𝑡+1                                                                    
Where, ‘𝑑’ is the cost of posting a vacancy.  
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Explanation of these equations is the following. A firm receives a positive return of 
(𝑝 − 𝑤𝑠𝑦) per period whenever the vacant firm gets a worker. Therefore when a young 
worker is matched with a firm at time 𝑡 the firm receives positive return for two consecutive 
periods with certainty. But after these two periods the post becomes empty and the firm 
has to post a vacancy to resume the production again. Therefore from period 𝑡 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ onwards 
𝑉𝑡+2 is the return to the firm. Similarly we get the equation for 𝐽𝑜𝑡. Notice one thing that 
here we are not allowing any time discount in our model. 
A vacant firm pays strictly positive fixed cost d to post a vacancy at each period. If the firm 
matches with a worker then firm either gets 𝐽𝑦𝑡  or 𝐽𝑜𝑡 according to the worker’s remaining 
life span, and on the other hand if the firm flounders to match with any worker then the 
firm has to start with a vacant post at period 𝑡 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ again; hence will receive 𝑉𝑡+1 from the 
next period onward.   
Free entry guarantees that in equilibrium 𝑉𝑡 = 0, for all t. Hence, both the J’s become time 
independent. 
𝐽𝑦 = 2(𝑝 − 𝑤𝑠𝑦)                                                                                                               (2)        
𝐽𝑜 = (𝑝 − 𝑤𝑠𝑜)                                                                                                                  (3) 
𝜋𝑡 =
𝑑
𝜙𝑡𝐽𝑦+(1−𝜙𝑡)𝐽𝑜
                                                                                                             (4) 
 
3.5   Wages 
Here we discuss about the factor payments. As the factor market of the unorganized sector 
is perfect a laborer receives her value marginal product as wage, and CRS production 
technology levels the marginal product and average product of laborer. Therefore the 
unorganized sector wage (𝑤𝑛) is equal to ‘𝑎’ (what she produces). Hence it is time 
independent.  
Both the firms and laborers have some strictly positive degree of bargaining power in the 
organized sector, and firm owner and laborer share the total value of production through 
Nash bargaining. If 𝛽(< 1) denotes the bargaining power of laborers, then the wages are 
determined by the following equations: 
 𝑤𝑠𝑦 = arg max
𝑤𝑠𝑦
 (2𝑤𝑠𝑦)
𝛽( 2𝑝 − 𝑤𝑠𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
1−𝛽    
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 𝑤𝑠𝑜 = arg max
𝑤𝑠𝑜
 (𝑤𝑠𝑜)
𝛽( 𝑝 − 𝑤𝑠𝑜)
1−𝛽    
i.e. 𝑤𝑠𝑦 = 𝑤𝑠𝑜 ≡ 𝑤𝑠 = 𝛽𝑝. Here we strengthen our assumption as 𝛽𝑝 > 𝑎 to make 𝑤𝑠 
higher than 𝑤𝑛, since the assumption that an organized sector is more productive than the 
unorganized one does not suffice to guarantee the stated wage differential.    
Therefore wages are not age dependent.  
(Calculations done by us indicate that if the outside options are included, then the two 
wages of organized sector become dependent on time, as also their equality breaks down. 
Including the outside options do not contribute significantly towards our analysis. More 
importantly they do not jeopardize the properties of the equilibrium, but make the analysis 
more cumbersome. For simplicity thus, we ignore the outside options. Interested readers 
though, can consult with the author). 
 
3.6   Decision problem 
Any individual in this economy faces a series of choice problems in her life span. At each 
point where she has to take a single decision, she gets three different possible options of 
action. They are the following: 
I. Organized sector job. 
II. Unorganized sector job. 
III. Wait. 
Initially at period one when she is about to enter the labor market she chooses one among 
the three. If second or third is selected then no more decisions are to be taken at that period. 
The first option, on the contrary, creates another choice problem. If she opts for the 
organized sector job then she has to pass through the search process which is a random 
‘lottery’ to her. After the ‘lottery’ she may get an organized job (call it as ‘lucky’ situation) 
or may remain unemployed (call it as ‘unlucky’ situation). Here she has to reveal state 
contingent decisions. Hence again she faces a choice problem and takes a call between the 
three for different states. In case of ‘unlucky’ situation the option of ‘organized job’ does 
not remain as a feasible one. We may interpret it as: choice of ‘organized job’ gives her a 
pay-off equal to almost negative infinity after she faces an unlucky situation. At the 
beginning of period two, when she becomes old, she has to follow the same path of decision 
problem.  
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All the decisions are taken by the individual at the beginning of her young age. Every agent 
can expect rationally. Decisions are taken so as to maximize the expected indirect utility. 
Uncertainty in the indirect utility arises because of the search-matching mechanism in 
organized sector. 
 
4 Short-run Equilibrium 
Following sub-sections discuss about the equilibrium solutions of the model in short-run.  
 
3.1   Optimal decisions  
Here we consider the optimal decisions of the different individuals. Heterogeneity among 
individuals arises because of their different level of inheritance (X). In our model, 
probability values which are generated from the labor market friction of the organized 
sector, are known (agents are rational) to the individual while they are taking decisions.  
Every individual optimally chooses to search for a job in the organized sector with any 
level of X, since the wage of this sector is strictly higher than the return from the 
unorganized sector or from unemployment.  Even if she fails to get a job in period one she 
goes for search in period two. But if she becomes ‘lucky’ in the first period, there is no 
more extra incentive to go for search in second period again. Since there is no cost for 
searching everyone takes a chance for receiving higher wage: unique solution at the 
beginning of the first period’s decision problem.  
Decisions vary from one individual to other for the following two situations. Agents, who 
face a ‘unlucky’ situation, opt for the unorganized sector job if she has 𝑋𝑡 ≤
𝑤𝑛
𝑘
. This 
decision remains the same, if she is ‘unlucky’ in both the two periods. On the contrary if 
her inheritance, 𝑋𝑡 , is greater than 
𝑤𝑛
𝑘
 then she never chooses to work in unorganized 
sector: even if she faces unlucky situation in both the periods. As stated earlier, agents have 
a disutility to work in unorganized sector due to her status, represented by her inheritance. 
Although the unorganized sector job gives an income gain, social stigma outweighs that 
gain for the individuals with higher X (read it as ‘higher status’). To follow the result 
formally, interested readers are requested to consult the Appendix 1.    
Therefore the following two strategies prevail in equilibrium:  
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i. Search for organized job is chosen, at the beginning and then, if becomes ‘lucky’, 
‘work for organized sector’ is chosen; if ‘unlucky’ be the case then wait is chosen. 
ii. Search for organized job is chosen, at the beginning and then, if becomes ‘lucky’, 
‘work for organized sector’ is chosen; if ‘unlucky’ be the case then unorganized job 
is chosen. 
The actual form of the expected indirect utility functions (EIU) for (i) and (ii) are as 
follows. (For derivations see the appendix 2). 
𝐸𝐼𝑈(i) =  𝑋 + 𝜌𝑡(2𝑤𝑠) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝜌𝑡+1(𝑤𝑠)                                                              (6) 
𝐸𝐼𝑈(ii) =  𝑋 − ((1 − 𝜌𝑡) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1))𝑘𝑋 + (2𝜌𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝜌𝑡+1)(𝑤𝑠) +
((1 − 𝜌𝑡) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1))(𝑤𝑛 ).                                                                       (7)                                                                                                                                                                          
In the figure below (figure 1) we plot the optimal expected indirect utility path, with needed 
parametric restrictions, noted by the thick line.  
                                                                                                
                                                                         
                                                                   
                                                                                                       
 
 
 
             
 
 
             
Note that this solution is true for any non-zero and non-unitary probability values generated 
from the organized sector. In the following section we solve for the equilibrium short-run 
probability values.  
 
      3.2    Factor market solutions 
At any point in time, populations from two consecutive generations are economically 
active. So, in our economy total population adds up to 2 at any instance. The whole young 
population and the old individuals who became ‘unlucky’ in their young age participate in 
𝑤𝑛
𝑘
 
Expected indirect 
Utility for (i) and (ii) 
Figure:1 
ii 
i 
𝑋 O 
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each search process. Then, if 𝑆𝑖 is the total number of job-seekers at time period 𝑖 so, 𝑆𝑖 =
1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑖−1𝜙𝑖−1 𝑆𝑖−1). As stated earlier 𝜙𝑡 is defined as the proportion of the young 
among the searching population at time 𝑡. Since the young population proportion (recollect, 
they all are searchers too) is equal to one, therefore 𝜙𝑡𝑆𝑡 = 1. The left hand side of the 
equation is the young pool of searchers. 
Hence, 𝑆𝑖 = 1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑖−1). 
Thus,  𝜙𝑡 =
1
2−𝜌𝑡−1
.                                                                                                          (8) 
As all the previous period values of each variables are known to the economy at period 𝑡, 
from equation 8, 𝜙𝑡 can be determined for each 𝑡. Once 𝜙𝑡 is known then using equation 
5 and equation 1 one can easily solve 𝜋𝑡 and 𝜌𝑡 for each 𝑡, as the wages are already 
determined.  
  
3.3 Inheritance distribution 
This section summarizes our discussion and interprets the results which we get from the 
previous analysis. Unemployment, as defined by the International Labour Organization, is 
the situation when people are without jobs and they have actively sought work for a given 
time period. In our model unemployed mass (according to this definition) lies above a 
certain level of X. We may consider  𝑋𝑐  as a critical inheritance level, people below which 
is termed as ‘poor’; otherwise ‘rich’. Optimal decision of the individual who has lesser 𝑋 
than 𝑋𝑐, shows that she chooses to work in the unorganized sector when she does not get 
the organized sector job. Where, in an ‘unlucky’ state individual with 𝑋 > 𝑋𝑐 does not 
choose to go for an unorganized job but to wait. Hence the poorer individuals at any point 
of time are working in this economy. Therefore they are not unemployed. People with the 
higher level of inheritance remain without any job if they become unlucky after an active 
search for a job in the organized sector. This is somewhat similar to the empirical facts 
mentioned in Section 2. 
Here we consider the different individuals from the different sections of the population, 
and find that where their dynasty may move in the next generation given their 𝑋 and the 
probability values. For this purpose, here we consider a system of dynamic equations.  
Let us call 
𝑤𝑛
𝑘
 as 𝑋𝑐.   
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𝑋𝑡 
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If 𝑋𝑡 ≤ 𝑋
𝑐 ,  
𝑋𝑡+2 = 𝛼(𝑋𝑡 + 2𝑤𝑠), with probability  𝜌𝑡                       (9) 
𝑋𝑡+2 = 𝛼(𝑋𝑡 + 𝑤𝑛 +𝑤𝑠), with probability   (1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝜌𝑡+1                                (10) 
𝑋𝑡+2 = 𝛼(𝑋𝑡 + 2𝑤𝑛), with probability  (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1)                    (11) 
If 𝑋𝑡 > 𝑋
𝑐,   
𝑋𝑡+2 = 𝛼(𝑋𝑡 + 2𝑤𝑠), with probability  𝜌𝑡    
𝑋𝑡+2 = 𝛼(𝑋𝑡 + 𝑤𝑠), with probability (1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝜌𝑡+1                                 (12) 
𝑋𝑡+2 = 𝛼(𝑋𝑡), with probability  (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1)                     (13) 
These equations are generated from an inherent assumption: 𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑏𝑡) and from the 
outcome of the maximization of the utility function (equation 5). Here for simplicity we 
assume that 𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑏𝑡 . Because of the assumed Cobb-Douglas structure of the utility 
function, optimization exercise yields that the bequest level is equal to the 𝛼 proportion of 
the total wealth of the individual.  
Other details of the equation are straight forward to see. If the agent receives the 
opportunity of working in the organized sector at the beginning of period 1, her wealth 
equates with (𝑋𝑡 + 2𝑤𝑠) for all 𝑋𝑡 at the end of period 2. So it explains equation (9). In 
case of the other equations inheritance level plays a key role. First we consider 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋𝑐. 
Individual works in unorganized sector if the ‘unlucky’ state is realized. It is true for both 
young and old age. That is, total wealth can be either (𝑋𝑡 + 𝑤𝑛 + 𝑤𝑠) or (𝑋𝑡 + 2𝑤𝑛) with 
probability (1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝜌𝑡+1 or (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1) respectively. Again, if 𝑋𝑡 > 𝑋
𝑐, optimal 
decision dictates the agent to wait when she does not get employment in organized sector 
after an active search. Hence if she fails to be ‘lucky’ in period 1 but receives organized 
sector job in next period then the total wealth of the individual is(𝑋𝑡 + 𝑤𝑠) and if she faces 
‘unlucky’ state in both the periods, her wealth remains as 𝑋𝑡. 
Let us depict the equations in the following figure:    
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Numbering of the bold lines is done according to the equation number.  
There may arise a situation where all the three lines cut the 45° line within [0, 𝑋𝑐]. In that 
case all individuals in the long run have inheritance less than 𝑋𝑐 and then no one in the 
population remains unemployed at any instant of time. That creates an uninteresting 
situation in the long run for the present purpose. We get the above figure by imposing 
suitable parametric restrictions (Appendix 3) such that we can concentrate on the case 
where unemployment prevails in the economy.   
From figure 2 we can have the following observation. Individual who herself initially starts 
as poor may bring her next generation to the richer section. Reverse is also true. This tells 
us that always a dynasty face a positive probability of changing the economic status 
between some arbitrary finite number of generations. Hence the economic mobility 
depends mostly on the labor market efficiency in this model. The corresponding transition 
probabilities a displayed below: 
𝑃(𝑋𝑡+2 > 𝑋
𝑐|𝑋𝑡 > 𝑋
𝑐) 
= 
{
 
 
 
 𝜌𝑡 ,                                                                                       𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑡 < (
𝑤𝑛
𝛼𝑘
− 𝑤𝑠)
𝜌𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝜌𝑡+1,                                                𝑖𝑓 (
𝑤𝑛
𝛼𝑘
− 𝑤𝑠) < 𝑋𝑡 <
𝑤𝑛
𝛼𝑘
1,                                                                                                           𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑃(𝑋𝑡+2 > 𝑋
𝑐|𝑋𝑡 < 𝑋
𝑐) 
= {
𝜌𝑡 ,                                                                            𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑡 < (
𝑤𝑛
𝛼𝑘
− 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑤𝑛)
𝜌𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝜌𝑡+1,                                                                       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
5 Long run equilibrium  
Now in this section, we consider the model with time dynamics. First we discuss the 
movement of the inheritance distribution with time, given any initial distribution. After that 
we will consider the dynamics of probability values.  
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4.1.  Population dynamics  
For each generation, there is a distribution of inheritance (𝑋) over the entire population. 
Let the distribution function be 𝐹𝑡(𝑋𝑡), where 𝑋𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑋) and ?̅? is the exogenous finite 
upper bound of inheritance (the construction of which is shown in fig 2). That is 𝐹𝑡(𝑋𝑡) 
proportion of people have less than or equal to 𝑋𝑡 amount of inheritance at period t. To 
analyze the evolution of the inheritance of the dynasty over time from an initial time period, 
we set up a starting point where the economy is populated by a given pool of old and young 
individuals with their respective inheritance levels. 
Note that, in our model if the probability values remain strictly positive and non-unitary 
then the inheritance distribution8 of the population can never become polarized. It cannot 
be the case that every individual become either ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ after a finite time. This 
remains true for any initial population distribution. This is a very significant departure from 
Galor and Zeira (1993). Factor market friction in organized sector develops this interesting 
phenomenon. The probabilistic nature of this factor market halts any unidirectional 
movement over X and opens up the more realistic possibility, that is, 𝑋 of a particular 
dynasty can move both way with time.  
 From Figure 2, let us we concentrate on 𝑋𝑙
𝑐  and 𝑋ℎ
𝑐. It is not difficult to prove that after a 
finite time, inheritance of all individual come within the interval [𝑋𝑙
𝑐 , 𝑋ℎ
𝑐], provided 
probability values remain strictly positive and non-unitary (the next sub-section shows that 
in the long-run equilibrium also it actually takes non-unitary value). Note that, in figure 2 
all lines cut the 45° line from below. Hence, if the model was a deterministic one then 𝑥  
or 𝑋ℎ
𝑐 would be a long run stable equilibrium. That is, the process might end up at 𝑥 or 𝑋ℎ
𝑐 
after infinite time interval. Because of the stochastic nature of the model under discussion, 
no 𝑋𝑡+2 can remain infinitely on the same inheritance path on which  𝑋𝑡 lies. There is 
always a positive probability of switching the path. Therefore, given a 𝑋𝑡 either 
below 𝑋𝑙
𝑐 𝑜𝑟 above 𝑋ℎ
𝑐, this dynamic process brings 𝑋𝑡+𝑛 within the stated interval after 
some arbitrary n (finite) periods. Once all 𝑋𝑡s come within the interval [𝑋𝑙
𝑐, 𝑋ℎ
𝑐], it is 
impossible to get out of that interval; although population will never converge at a point 
(or on some points). For certain parametric restriction simulation result (shown in section 
                                                            
8 X is a good proxy of wealth since, X is a function of b and b depends on the wealth. 
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5) displays that long-run distribution of 𝑋 converges to a bounded and continuous wealth 
distribution.  
 
4.2. Factor market dynamics 
In this subsection, again we return to the factor market. Here we consider the factor market 
behavior with time. We have seen earlier that factor market variable of the unorganized 
sector is time independent, so we concentrate on the factor market of the organized sector.   
Let us reframe the equation (4) using equation (1). 
𝜌𝑡 = 1 −
𝑑
𝜙𝑡𝐽𝑦+(1−𝜙𝑡)𝐽𝑜
                                                                                                    (13) 
Using (8) and (13) we get a difference equation of 𝜙𝑡. 
𝜙𝑡 =
1
(1+
𝑑
𝜙𝑡−1𝐽𝑦+(1−𝜙𝑡−1)𝐽𝑜
)
                                                                                                (14) 
Following results are easy to check: 
𝛿𝜙𝑡
𝛿𝜙𝑡−1
> 0,
𝛿2𝜙𝑡
𝛿𝜙𝑡−1 
2 < 0.  
0 < 𝜙𝑡|(𝜙𝑡−1 = 0) < 1, 0 < 𝜙𝑡|(𝜙𝑡−1 = 1) < 1 and 𝜙𝑡|(𝜙𝑡−1 = 0) < 𝜙𝑡|(𝜙𝑡−1 = 1) 
(see Appendix 4). Now we put the above results in figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                              
 
 
                                   
 
So, it is clear that in the long run 𝜙𝑡 converges to an interior stable equilibrium, A. 
Therefore the long run probability values remain strictly positive and non-unitary. Hence 
in the long run, 𝜙𝑡 becomes time independent. As we solve for 𝜙 all other endogenous 
B 
1 
1 
   O 
45° 
A 
𝜙𝑡−1  
𝜙𝑡 
B' 
Figure 3 
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variables of imperfect factor market, 𝜌, 𝜋 and hence 𝑆, can be determined. This proves the 
existence of unemployment in the long-run equilibrium.  
 
5. Comparative Static Results   
In this section we find on how the economy changes with the change of two different 
parameters: one is production parameter and other is from factor market. Actually we focus 
on the parametric change of the organized sector because this is the sector which makes 
our model interesting and plays a very crucial role for this hypothetical economy.   
 
5.1. Effect of change in production technology  
Suppose productivity of the organized sector (i.e. 𝑝) jumps up due to some exogenous 
technological upgradation. So, a filled job pays more and hence increases the incentive of 
posting vacancies. That is, 𝑉𝑡 becomes positive. Therefore more new firms enter and post 
vacancies till 𝑉𝑡 remains positive. That increase in the number of the vacancy increases the 
probability (i.e. 𝜌𝑡) of getting a job in the organized sector in short-run. Mathematically it 
is clear that an increase in 𝑝 leads to a rise in the denominator of RHS of the equation 4. 
Hence 𝜋𝑡 falls for a rise in the productivity of the organized sector and that implies an 
increase in 𝜌𝑡 from equation 1. 
Another interesting thing to notice is the following. Since probability of being ‘lucky’ rises, 
it actually decreases the proportion of searchers within the searching population who are 
old. (Remember that the old searchers are those who failed to get organized job in their 
younger age).  
In Figure 3, BB' curve shifts up with a rise in 𝑝 and accordingly A, the steady state point 
of 𝜙, also moves in upward direction. From equation (13) it is evident that 𝜙 and 𝜌 changes 
in the same direction. Therefore if 𝑝 increases, the long-run steady state value of 𝜙 and 𝜌 
also increases, and 𝜋 falls.  
As 𝜌𝑡 changes in the positive direction with 𝑝, the total unemployment at time 𝑡 (i.e. short-
run9) of the economy declines. On the other hand GDP at time 𝑡 rises through both the 
                                                            
9 This claim is true for short-run. Since change in 𝑝 changes the probability of the job match, and hence the 
transition probabilities (probability of switching the income class: rich to poor and the reverse) also change, 
that perturbs the whole inheritance distribution. Therefore long-run change in unemployment or GDP can be 
shown by simulation results.  
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increase in productivity and the increment in the probability of getting matched in the 
organized sector. Although the total production of the unorganized sector falls because of 
shortage in the supply of labor higher productivity of the organized sector outweighs that 
loss in GDP at time 𝑡. Therefore a more advanced technology in the organized sector 
implies a higher GDP coupled with a lower unemployment and this has accorded with our 
empirical findings documented earlier.  
Mathematical proofs are in the Appendix 5.  
 
5.2. Effect of change in cost of posting a vacancy 
In this sub-section we show the comparative static result by simulation study too. It is 
evident that if the cost of posting a vacancy (i.e. 𝑑) falls, it also makes posting a vacancy 
lucrative. Hence it increases the number of vacancy posting. If 𝑑 falls, as the previous one, 
BB' moves upwardly and similar effects take place. So, as 𝑑 falls total unemployment 
decreases and GDP increases (Appendix 6) at time 𝑡 (in short-run). 
Knowing the fact that this comparative statics theoretically will not add anything new (from 
the previous sub-section), we put this into a different subsection as we would like to show 
the economy wide importance of factor market efficiency in the long run income 
distribution. 
We are summarizing (see next section for detailed results in tabular form) what we have 
obtained from simulation study with appropriate parameter values for a very large iteration 
here: 
i. Initial distribution of inheritance does not affect the long run distribution. Long 
run wealth distribution does not depend on initial distribution.  
ii. Country with higher cost of posting vacancy faces a greater level of long-run 
unemployment and a lesser level of long-run GDP. 
iii. If cost of vacancy is high enough then in the long run economy wise inheritance 
distribution becomes biased towards lower income and the vice-versa.  
If factor market is not efficient enough (i.e. high ‘d’) then the distribution of income 
resembles Pareto distribution. Results show that even if initially a country starts with a very 
high average income then also the average income of the country may drop down because 
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of factor market inefficiency. On the other hand an initially poor country can become a 
high average income country by improving their factor market.  
Countries like USA10 or Norway11, representative of lesser labor market friction, show that 
the long run income distribution is skewed towards the higher income quintiles. On the 
other hand, for countries like Brazil or India income distribution is skewed in favor of 
Pareto distribution.  
 
6. Simulation Results  
This section elaborates the numerical exercise done in this work. Since the long-run wealth 
distribution in our model is theoretically intractable, though it has a serious influence on 
the findings, this section has a separate importance. Following table displays the 
hypothetical parametric assumptions. 
Table1: Parameter values 
Parameters  Description Value 
𝛼 Proportion of income spent for bequest 0.40 
𝑑 Cost of posting a vacancy (Low) 0.25 
𝑑ℎ Cost of posting a vacancy (High) 0.54 
𝛽 Bargaining power of an organized sector worker 0.55 
𝑝 Marginal productivity of labor in organized sector (Low) 1 
𝑝ℎ Marginal productivity of labor in organized sector (High) 1.5 
𝑘 Disutility parameter from social stigma 0.5 
𝑎 Marginal productivity of labor in unorganized sector 0.22 
Number of individuals under observation are 10000. Number of iteration is, T=1000.  
Following are the results reported for the parametric restrictions given in the table above.  
 
Result 1: The distribution of inheritance converges in the long run. That steady state 
distribution does not depend on the initial wealth distribution. 
 
                                                            
10  Economic inequality through the prisms of income and consumption, David S. Johnson, 
Timothy M. Smeeding, and Barbara Boyle Torrey (http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/04/art2full.pdf) 
11 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/hod/documents/regpubl/stmeld/2006-2007/Report-No-20-2006-
2007-to-the-Storting/2/2/1.html?id=466524 
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Following table depicts Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for the convergence test of the 
long-run inheritance distribution. 
Table2: Convergence of inheritance distribution 
Initial wealth distribution  ‘T’ vis-à-vis 
‘(T-1)’ 
‘T’ vis-à-vis 
‘(T-100)’ 
Normal 
 
0.0094 
(0.7671) 
0.0158 
(0.1633) 
 
Uniform 
 
0.0169 
(0.1138) 
 
0.0126 
(0.4032) 
 
Single valued  
(all the values are same  
but below the cut-off level) 
 
0.0260 
(0.8840) 
 
0.0270 
(0.8547) 
 
Single valued  
(all the values are same  
but above the cut-off level) 
 
0.0055 
(0.9981) 
 
0.0154 
(0.1850) 
 
Following table shows the convergence in the long run starting from two different initial 
wealth distributions given the other parametric values. Results narrates that initial 
condition has no significant role for the long run distribution of inheritance.  
Table3: Convergence test starting from two different initial distribution of inheritance 
Two different initial  distributions Kolmogorov-Smirnov  
test statistic  
Normal vis-à-vis Uniform 0.0164 
(0.1345) 
 
Normal vis-à-vis Single valued (below the cut-off) 
 
0.0267 
(0.5306) 
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Normal vis-à-vis Single valued (above cut-off)             0.0086 
(0.8519) 
 
Uniform vis-à-vis Single valued (below the cut-off) 
 
 
0.0358 
           (0.1907) 
 
Uniform vis-à-vis Single valued (above the cut-off) 
 
0.6020 
(0.0108) 
 
Single valued: below cut-off vis-à-vis above the cut-off 
 
0.0296 
(0.3981) 
 
Result 2: The long-run steady state GDP increases and the long-run steady state 
unemployment decreases for an increase in the productivity of the organized sector.  
 
Following two figures (figure 4 and figure 5) display the above result. We compute the 
whole model for a higher value of 𝑝 (≡ 𝑝ℎ) and compare the GDP and the unemployment 
values for the two different situations. This exercise is done with the uniform initial wealth 
distribution.  
 
GDP for 𝑝ℎ 
GDP for 𝑝 
Figure 4 
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Result 3: The long-run steady state GDP decreases and the long-run steady state 
unemployment rises for a higher value of cost of posting vacancy at the organized sector.  
 
Following two figures (figure 6 and figure 7) display the above result. We compute the 
whole model for a higher value of 𝑑 (≡ 𝑑ℎ) and compare the GDP and the unemployment 
values for the two different situations. This exercise is done with the uniform initial wealth 
distribution. 
 
 
Unemployment for 𝑝ℎ 
Unemployment for 𝑝 
Figure 5 
For 𝑑 
For 𝑑ℎ 
Figure 6 
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Result 4: If cost of vacancy is high enough then in the long run economy wise inheritance 
distribution becomes biased towards lower income and the vice-versa. 
 
Next two histograms depict the long-run inheritance distribution of the individuals for the 
two different level of cost of posting vacancies (for 𝑑 and 𝑑ℎ respectively).  
 
For 𝑑 
For 𝑑ℎ 
Figure 7 
For 𝑑 
Figure 8 
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7. Conclusion  
Walrasian general equilibrium framework has established the fact that “…factors of 
production are always fully employed in the full-information, frictionless markets” 
(Davidson, et al., 1988). To account for the presence of unemployment, economists have 
sometimes relaxed the assumptions of ‘frictionless markets’ or have avoided ‘full 
information’ situation. Keeping all these contributions in mind we think that an explicit 
relation between inheritance and unemployment; generated due to labor market friction, 
needs to be established.  
This model churns out a relationship between unemployment and inheritance, and 
postulates that, individuals who inherit relatively more remain unemployed. It showcases 
the existence of unemployment together with the persistance of a perfect and an imperfect 
labor market in the equilibrium both in long and short run without restricting ‘on the job 
search’ (c.f. Davidson, Martin, & Matusz, 1988). A cut-off inheritance level is determined 
under which no one chooses to continue without positive earning.  
This model offers a dynamics such that the descendent of any agent can move either below 
or above the cut-off level of inheritance with positive probability given her present level of 
inheritance. That is, we refute the importance of the initial and thus, we discord with the 
concept of equilibrium trap which suggests that if a country begins with a very low (or 
Figure 9 
For 𝑑ℎ 
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high) income can never change their situation in long run. The present paper guarantees an 
inheritance (and thus, income) distribution spread out both below and above the cut-off in 
the long run. The long run income distribution is moderated only by the productivity 
parameters or the factor market parameters and not due to initial inheritance distribution.  
A possible alley of extension of this work can accommodate unemployment for targeted 
income groups (for example the middle class) as well as study the consequences of trade 
on unemployment in this framework.  
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 1  
Here the optimal decisions of the agents are solved. Since in the discussed model, cost of 
searching is equal to zero, each individual likes to search for an organized sector job at 
each period. An agent can receive a higher wage from organized sector, only if she faces 
the search process. But she does not lose anything if she goes for search. Therefore she can 
take a chance in the search process of the organized sector to get a higher wage without 
cost. Hence, it is optimal for any agent to search in the organized sector. The choice 
problem between opting for a search or not is actually a comparison between weighted 
average with strictly positive weights and the minimum value, where all values are not 
identical. Hence, opting for search becomes a dominant strategy.  
The following table shows different pay-offs for different strategies under alternative states 
of the world. States and strategies are noted in rows and columns respectively. Notations 
used in the table are likewise: ‘L’ and ‘U’ indicate lucky and unlucky situations; ‘O’, ‘N’ 
and ‘W’ are for organized job, unorganized job and wait, respectively.  
Pay-off matrix of each period:  
 
 O N W 
L 𝑤𝑠 𝑤𝑛 − 𝑘𝑋 0 
U 
not 
applicable 
𝑤𝑛 − 𝑘𝑋 0 
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Optimal solutions are illustrated below 
for, 𝑋 ≤ 𝑤𝑛/𝑘                             for, 𝑋 >  𝑤𝑛/𝑘  
if L then  O                        if L then              O 
if U then  N                        if U then              W 
 
Since the agent faces the same pay-off matrix in second period, optimal decisions also 
remain also unchanged.   
Recollect that in our model, after being lucky the job cannot be destroyed, therefore if an 
agent receives the state L in period one then realization of any state in period two makes 
no difference to her pay-off. Hence if she is lucky in period one then she continues as 
organized sector worker in both the periods of her life.  
 
Appendix 2 
Expected indirect utility representations (EIU) of the optimal decisions for a representative 
individual are written below. 
If 𝑋 ≤
𝑤𝑛
𝑘
 then  
𝐸𝐼𝑈|
𝑋≤
𝑤𝑛
𝑘
 
= (𝜌𝑡)(2𝑤𝑠) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(𝑤𝑛 − 𝑘𝑋) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑠
+ (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1)(𝑤𝑛 − 𝑘𝑋) + 𝑋 
 
= [(𝜌𝑡)(2𝑤𝑠) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)𝑤𝑛 + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑠 + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑛]
+ [1 − (1 − 𝜌𝑡) − (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1)]𝑋 
 
= [𝜌𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(𝜌𝑡+1)]𝑤𝑠 + [(1 − 𝜌𝑡 ) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1)]𝑤𝑛
+ [1 − (1 − 𝜌𝑡) − (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑡+1)]𝑋    
 
𝐸𝐼𝑈|
𝑋>
𝑤𝑛
𝑘
 
= (𝜌𝑡)(2𝑤𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡)(𝜌𝑡+1)𝑤𝑠 + 𝑋 
 
Appendix 3 
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Parameter restrictions for the figure 2 are listed below: 
i) 
𝑤𝑛
(𝑤𝑛+𝑤𝑠)
<
𝛼𝑘
1−𝛼
<
𝑤𝑛
𝑤𝑠
 
ii)   
𝑤𝑛
2𝛼𝑘
< 𝑤𝑠 < (
1
𝛼𝑘
− 1)𝑤𝑛 
iii) 
𝛼
1−𝛼
<
1
2𝑘
 
Where 𝑤𝑛 = 𝑎 and 𝑤𝑠 = 𝛽𝑝. 
 
Appendix 4  
𝛿𝜙𝑡
𝛿𝜙𝑡−1
=
𝑑(𝐽𝑦−𝐽𝑜)
(𝑑+𝜙𝑡−1𝐽𝑦+(1−𝜙𝑡−1)𝐽𝑜)
2  
𝛿2𝜙𝑡
𝛿𝜙𝑡−1
2 = (−2) ×
𝑑(𝐽𝑦−𝐽𝑜)
2
(𝑑+𝜙𝑡−1𝐽𝑦+(1−𝜙𝑡−1)𝐽𝑜)
3  
𝜙𝑡|(𝜙𝑡−1 = 0) =
1
1+
1
𝐽𝑜
< 1 and positive. 
𝜙𝑡|(𝜙𝑡−1 = 1) =
1
1+
1
𝐽𝑦
< 1 and positive. 
 
Appendix 5 
𝛿𝜙𝑡
𝛿𝑝
=
𝑑
(𝑑+𝜙𝑡𝐽𝑦+(1−𝜙𝑡)𝐽𝑜)
2 × (𝜙𝑡−1
𝛿𝐽𝑦
𝛿𝑝
+ (1 − 𝜙𝑡−1)
𝛿𝐽𝑜
𝛿𝑝
) > 0, for all 0 < 𝜙𝑡−1 < 1. 
and 
𝛿𝜌𝑡
𝛿𝜙𝑡
> 0  
Where, 
𝛿𝐽𝑦(𝑝)
𝛿𝑝
> 0,  
𝛿𝐽𝑜(𝑝)
𝛿𝑝
> 0. 
Total Unemployment  
≡ 𝑇𝑈𝑡 = (1 − 𝐹𝑡−1(𝑋
𝑐)) (1 − 𝜌𝑡−1)(1 − 𝜌𝑡) + (1 − 𝐹𝑡(𝑋
𝑐))(1 − 𝜌𝑡). 
𝛿𝑇𝑈𝑡
𝛿𝑝
< 0  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = [𝐹𝑡−1(𝑋
𝑐) (1 − 𝜌𝑡−1)(1 − 𝜌𝑡) + 𝐹𝑡(𝑋
𝑐)(1 − 𝜌𝑡)]𝑎 + [𝜌𝑡−1𝜙𝑡−1𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝑡𝑆𝑡]𝑝. 
𝛿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝛿𝑝
= 𝜌𝑡−1(1 − 𝜌𝑡) + 2𝜌𝑡 + [(𝑝 − 𝐹𝑡(𝑋
𝑐)𝑎) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡−1)(𝑝 − 𝐹𝑡−1(𝑋
𝑐)𝑎)]
𝛿𝜌𝑡
𝛿𝑝
 
                > 0. 
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Appendix 6 
𝛿𝜙𝑡
𝛿𝑑
= −
1
(1+
𝑑
𝜙𝑡−1𝐽𝑦+(1−𝜙𝑡−1)𝐽𝑜
)
2 ×
1
𝜙𝑡−1𝐽𝑦+(1−𝜙𝑡−1)𝐽𝑜
 < 0.  
𝛿𝑇𝑈𝑡
𝛿𝑑
> 0.  
𝛿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝛿𝑑
= [(𝑝 − 𝐹𝑡(𝑋
𝑐)𝑎) + (1 − 𝜌𝑡−1)(𝑝 − 𝐹𝑡−1(𝑋
𝑐)𝑎)]
𝛿𝜌𝑡
𝛿𝑑
< 0. 
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